Also, hardened sites are not mobile once discovered, they remain so. Hardening is attractive, but it comes at the price of concealment: for example, it is difficult to hide the major construction entailed in building a nuclear silo. No single strategy of survivability is ideal, because each entails important trade-offs. Stalemate are reversible, then the central puzzle of the nuclear era-continued geopolitical competition-is no longer a puzzle. If arsenals have been more vulnerable than theorists assume, or if survivability and ![]() In short, if nuclear stalemate can be broken, one should expect countries to act as they always have when faced with military threats: by trying to exploit new technologies and strategies for destroying adversary capabilities. Moreover, states may be enticed to develop their own counterforce capabilities in order to disarm their adversaries or limit the damage those adversaries can inflict in case of war. They will value allies, which help contribute resources and valuable territory. They will worry about relative gains, because a rich and powerful adversary will have more resources to invest in technology and military forces. If arsenal survivability depends on the uncertain course of technological change and the efforts of adversaries to develop new technologies, states will feel compelled to arms race to ensure that their deterrent forces remain survivable in the face of adversary advances. ![]() Today, nuclear powers still eye each other's economic power and military capabilities warily strive for superiority over their adversaries in conventional and nuclear armaments aim toĬontrol strategically relevant areas of land, air, sea, and space seek to build and maintain alliances and prepare for war. 17 World War III was averted, as nuclear deterrence theory would predict, but the transformation of international politics that advocates of the theory of the nuclear revolution anticipated never materialized. The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular, is filled with empirical anomalies: extensive arms racing, intense concerns about relative power gains and losses, and competition for allies and control of strategic territory-all occurring at a time when the main adversaries appeared to be invulnerable to disarming strikes. Proponents of the theory of the nuclear revolution have always recognized the discrepancy between their theory's predictions and the actual behavior of countries in the nuclear era. The nuclear revolution acknowledge this anomalous behavior, they attribute it to misguided leaders, bureaucratic pathologies, or dysfunctional domestic politics, not flaws in the theory itself. 6 Yet, if the theory is correct-that is, if nuclear weapons solve countries' most fundamental security problems-why do nuclear-armed countries continue to perceive serious threats from abroad and engage in intense security competition? Why have the great powers of the nuclear era behaved in many ways like their predecessors from previous centuries: by building alliances, engaging in arms races, competing for relative gains, and seeking to control strategic territory-none of which should matter much if nuclear weapons guarantee one's security? Although proponents of the theory of According to one of the leading theories of geopolitics in the nuclear era, the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” nuclear weapons are the ultimate instruments of deterrence, protecting those who possess them from invasion or other major attacks. The growing vulnerability of nuclear forces sheds light on an enduring theoretical puzzle of the nuclear age. The new era of counterforceĬhallenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age-hardening and concealment-have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks-those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces-were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. ![]() Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals.
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